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Abstract
Contemporary educational policies have recently prioritised the development of generic, core, and transfer-
able skills. Th is essay refl ects on this tendency in the context of the ‘algorithmic condition’ and those discourses 
that tend toward an image of education that privileges dematerialised skills, practices, and knowledge. It 
argues that this turn towards dematerialisation is resonant with shifts in a number of diff erent domains, 
including work, and explores some of the implications of this shift. Instead I suggest an approach to educa-
tion that understands it as turning towards the world, loving the world, and creating a common world. In 
order to understanding thinking and knowing as material practices, the concept of ‘material thinking’ is 
developed that refuses binaries of theory and practice, but that instead understands thinking, particularly 
in educational contexts, as material and a practice of thinking with something, and a turning towards the 
world. I draw upon the work of Susan Oyama, Elizabeth Grosz, Tim Ingold and Isabelle Stengers, and explore 
the example of Barbara McClintock’s research as a cytogeneticist researching maize. Here I am particularly 
interested in the importance of deep engagement with a subject matter in terms of developing the skilfulness 
that is associated with what I am calling ‘material thinking’. Th is allows us to think about education in a way 
that pays attention to the plurality of practices of material thinking that engage with the natural history of 
humankind, and the story of the world.
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Matter without Materiality: Th e Algorithmic Turn
“Hypercapitalism is emancipating itself from its Western heritage and so-called ‘values’. 
But this reveals a terrible panorama: capitalism without the heritage of humanism and the 
Enlightenment is a regime of pure, unlimited violence.”1
What are the implications for life and for thought of the de-materialising turn of contem-
porary fi nance capitalism, the rise of soft surveillance and machine learning, and the empty 
language of audit cultures? Can generic and transferable skills be developed independent 
of any form of material practice? How can thinking come to more thoroughly involve the 
1 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, (2011) After the Future (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011), 31.
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kind of education of the senses that is born of engagement with a specifi c subject matter? 
Do today’s accelerated temporalities leave suffi  cient time for living, sensing and thinking 
given the limitations of the capacity for experience of fi nite animals? Is this the dawn of a 
new era, not of Man as Machine, but Human as Algorithm? What might a re-envisioning of 
the humanities and sciences involve? In response to these questions, this essay refl ects on 
one kind of thinking, material thinking, as a riposte to the prevalence of skills talk and the 
algorithmic condition. It is by no means the only kind of thinking that we might come to 
value, but it is one particularly concerned with the education of attention. Such an educa-
tion involves turning towards the reality of the world in its particularity in such a way that 
it is committed to preserving the world, caring for it, and to its renewal; it is an education 
that can nourish us and help us to live. Turning towards the world by no means guarantees 
the cultivation of an ethical sensibility capable of attending to the other as other, but it 
may sensitise us to the fact that the other exists, and can surprise us, just as the world can 
surprise us, be it the low light in a small Scottish village, Ai Wei Wei’s untitled black and 
white wallpaper depicting the fl ight of refugees alongside barbed wire and soldiers, or the 
writings of Raimond Gaita on the personal nature of ethics or on saintliness. 
When I question the privileging of ‘generic skills’ in policies and discourses purportedly 
concerned with education, this is nothing new. I do so in order to also draw attention to 
the many varieties of skilfulness implicit in and necessary for practices of material thinking 
across a range of domains. Th e matter of thinking, and of education, come alive through 
loving attention, be it of research, teaching or study. Here I am concerned with retrieving 
the important idea that education is about turning towards the world, and the encounter 
with the world, not fi rst and foremost about the self, even if the self is transformed through 
that encounter, as it inevitably is if we are moved in our educational experiences. Th e recent 
shift to the language of learning occludes the role of the teacher in illuminating the world, 
the person who helps students to see, read and love the world by exploring together its 
rich traditions and practices. Such illumination tends to arise through the steady encoura-
gement by teachers of practices of attention, ostension, observation, and active receptivity, 
staying with something for long enough that it might disclose itself under a diff erent light, 
and hopefully, for a student, coming to see what might seem quite ordinary or unintere-
sting otherwise in light of a teacher’s love and enthusiasm, or at least to appreciate how 
these forms of love keep knowledges alive. Raimond Gaita, describing the eff ect on him 
of his teacher Martin Winkler, writes “As a human being he wanted, and as a teacher felt 
obliged, to share what he loved with his students, hoping that they would fi nd it worthy of 
their love and that it would nourish in them a love of the world, as it had in him.”2 Th is love 
of the world can be, at least in part, cultivated through some of the practices of material 
thinking that I describe later in the text. It is certainly revealed through them.
2 Raimond Gaita, Love and teaching: Renewing a common world, Oxford Review of Education, 38 (6), December 
2012, 761-769. https://doi.org/10.1080/03054985.2012.745046.
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In contrast to the love of the world, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi3 says that we are witnessing a 
de-materialising turn across work and education that undermines the possibility of educa-
ting attention. Th is risks forgetting the world, that delicate and fragile shared achievement 
of understanding, knowledge, remembering, sensing, and indeed thinking that is renewed 
by and with each generation and the tendency towards de-materialisation is compounded 
by the pressures on time that fragment attention. Material thinking sees education as part 
of a loving encounter with the world and as a way of understanding and communicating 
what it means to come to know and to love something. Creating a common world means 
inviting diverse perspectives, artefacts, stories and knowledges to become manifest and 
shareable, that is public, in a context in which there are increasingly fewer ‘public spaces’ or 
matters of public concern, and little concern for inter-generational heritages.
With the rise of generic skills-talk, the diff erence between the student and the worker 
becomes more diffi  cult to discern. Paolo Virno4 claims that the new wage labourer must 
exemplify “habitual mobility, the ability to keep pace with extremely rapid conversions, 
adaptability in every enterprise, fl exibility in moving from one group of rules to another, 
aptitude for both banal and omni-lateral linguistic interaction, command of the fl ow of 
information, and the ability to navigate among limited possible alternatives”, in short, “the 
habit of developing no durable habits at all”5. Elements of this image have gravitated into 
global policy discourses in education and research with forms of information-talk and skills-
talk that fail to pay attention to the question of education risking the precipitation of a 
new kind of procedural idealism when they intimate, through metaphor and image, that 
information and skills can exist without bodies, organisms, artefacts or matter. 
Th e algorithmic turn, or the algorithmic condition, is not just one in which matter 
doesn’t matter in the way that it used to; it is one that privileges anticipatory and pre-emp-
tive logics that undo the presence required for educational attention and, with the rise of 
big data and machine learning, real time pedagogically tailored responses that make surpri-
ses if not impossible, then undesirable. Ben Williamson writes, “Th e notion of an algorithmic 
imaginary thus captures the Silicon Valley ideal of calculating, predicting and pre-empting 
human behaviours and social institutions through technical platforms that are increasingly 
automated and data-driven. Th e technocratic ideal of complete scientifi c calculability and 
technical objectivity associated with algorithmic practice underpins its approach.”6 Th is 
algorithmic turn arguably shares, at least in part, a conceptual register with those policy 
approaches and discourses that foreground the importance of core, generic and transfera-
ble skills because of their purported value in preparing students for unknowable futures, 
or perhaps more precisely, for unknowable forms of employment, labour and work. Both 
3 Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, After the Future. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011).
4 Paolo Virno, “Th e Ambivalence of Disenchantment” in Radical Th ought in Italy. Eds. A. Negri and M. Hardt. (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 13-36.
5 Virno, 14.
6 Ben Williamson (2016) “Silicon startup schools: technocracy, algorithmic imaginaries and venture philanthropy in 
corporate education reform”, Critical Studies in Education, 5. DOI: 10.1080/17508487.2016.1186710
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algorithmic culture and skills discourses share a temporal orientation towards the (unkno-
wable) future, both fail to adequately attend to the matter or content of common concern, 
both aim for control, in diff erent ways, in response to profound uncertainty, and neither is 
much concerned with the love of the world. 
In saying this, I do not wish to argue that the acknowledgement of skills (and compe-
tences) is wholly unwelcome or that skills are peripheral to the educational endeavour. Nor 
do I think that machine learning cannot off er a re-imagining of what it means to know 
something. However, the reifi cation of generic skills and pre-emptive practices of algorith-
mic governance, combined with the bracketing of the question of the purpose of educa-
tion, risk subordinating the practice of education to the mere transmission of generic and 
transferable skills that are, crucially, uncoupled from any content, fi eld or discipline. For 
them the matter of education is indiff erent, just as the student qua subject becomes irre-
levant. Th is shift from the language of education to the language of skills and learning can 
also be found in personalised learning models driven by data analytics. Th e value system 
underpinning this approach is premised on technical solutions to educational problems, 
evidenced by a turn to ‘ed-tech’ and even ‘neuro-education’. Even if education involves 
skills, it is not equivalent to skills acquisition. Knowing, thinking and understanding in edu-
cation all require intimacy with the subject matter; they are the practices through which 
we encounter our common world, the stories of the past, the wonders of the universe, and 
the natural history of humankind.
For Hannah Arendt, education is concerned with the preservation and the love of the 
world, that is, it is concerned with conserving the rich stories of the world and humankind. 
For this reason, education is always about the past, that is, the world, which educators 
introduce to the next generation, the newcomers to our common world. Teachers intro-
duce the world to each generation through curricula that present matters of common 
concern in all their richness and complexity for shared study and understanding; her defi -
nition of education makes it clear that teachers are responsible for the world because they 
teach children about the world, saying ‘Th is is our world’. In her 1958 text, Th e Human 
Condition7, she describes the ways in which images of process, algorithmic logics, forma-
lism, and bureaucracy were already becoming privileged in contemporary life, just as in her 
essay ‘Th e Crisis in Education’, she criticised the loss of a sense of what education involves 
when life skills come to be privileged over learning something8. Th ese two concerns are 
not unconnected. Arendt sees this as part of world-alienation and superfl uousness, the 
designed obsolescence of things, and the atomic individualism that consumerist society 
was bringing in its wake. Th e loss of homo faber and of things built to last leads to the cor-
rosion of public spaces - the space of the political, the undoing of our common world, and 
the loss of the sense of responsibility for the world. Th is sense of loss is intensifi ed in an era 
of big data, machine learning and the automation of work. I do not raise these concerns in 
7 Hannah Arendt, Th e Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
8 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Essays in Political Th ought. (New York: Viking Press, 1961).
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order to appeal to a nostalgic image of the human. I want to hold on to a variant of homo 
faber as the technological species but the image of homo faber that interests me is one 
that resists behavioural logics that reduce humans to a complex concatenation of data 
points, and that seek to intervene pre-emptively without allowing for the surprise of the 
educational encounter, equating education and learning with information processing or 
enhanced cognition, as we fi nd in much ‘ed-tech’. Materiality, matter, and bodies can easily 
be occluded or forgotten when bureaucratic and computational modalities of thinking 
over-code diff erent and distinct fi elds of knowledge, including those that have both con-
stituted and cultivated the subject matters that have occupied human thinking, life and 
practices over millennia. Th e co-imbrication of control, communication and information 
in the contemporary world serves to produce an image of ‘disembodied’ information and 
abstract and generic skills, which increasingly shapes social, political, economic and educa-
tional imaginaries. 
Drawing attention instead to pluralistic and material practices of thinking in educa-
tion encourages awareness of the ways in which humans, things and other organisms are 
embedded and entangled in relationships at multiple levels, from the bacteria that popu-
late bodies to the retina’s relationship with light waves, turning our attention to the world. 
Th is pluralistic, emergent and attenuated approach understands material thinking as both 
materially instantiated, in some form, and context-dependent, whether the matter of 
thought at play be the operations of symbolic logic, the solution of a mathematic equa-
tion, or the creation of a gesture in choreography. It does not seek to too swiftly sever the 
epistemological from the ontological. Th is prevents thinking from being too readily co-
opted into the kind of formal and operational abstraction suggested by terms like ‘generic’ 
skills, which suggest that mastery and capacity is possible without the intimacy entailed in 
developing knowledge of and in a subject matter through practice in a concrete situation. 
What, in any case, would skills that are uncoupled from context and content even look 
like? In a story called “Th e Great Swimmer” from Kafka’s unpublished notebooks9, he writes, 
“Hail the great swimmer! Hail the great swimmer!” the people shouted. I was coming from 
the Olympic Games in Antwerp, where I had just set a world record in swimming. I stood at 
the top of the steps outside the train station in my Hometown – where was it? – and looked 
down at the indiscernible throng in the dusk [..] “Honored guests! I have, admittedly, broken 
a world record. If, however, you were to ask me how I have achieved this, I could not answer 
adequately. Actually, I cannot even swim. I have always wanted to learn, but have never had 
the opportunity. How then did it come to be that I was sent by my country to the Olympic 
Games? Th is is, of course, also the question I ask of myself.”10 
Although at fi rst glance the story of Kafka’s swimmer seems absurd, arguably, it off ers the 
consummate image for the wage labourer or student today. Across a range of human acti-
9 Franz Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Stories. (London: Penguin, 1978).
10 Kafka, 314-16.
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vities, the formal and empty language of generic, core or transferrable skills prevails, in 
short, skills that apparently can be achieved in abstraction from material practices or enga-
gement in study. 
Bringing Th inking to Life
Understanding thinking as a material practice involves paying attention to both the 
matter of thinking and the ways in which thinking itself is material, for example, in phi-
losophy, sound, fi lm and metalwork. Th is is not the same as some of the other ways in 
which thinking something have been described. Gadamer described Martin Heidegger’s 
pedagogical approach as he philosophised aloud in class, noting, “One need only recall 
the way Heidegger approached the lectern – the excited and almost angry seriousness 
with which his thought was ventured, the way he glanced askance at the window, his eyes 
only brushing over the audience, and the way his voice was pushed to its very limit in all 
of the excitement”.11 Th is exemplifi ed thinking in action: thinking that was visible, palpa-
ble through the vibrations of the voice, following the concepts he created in speaking, as 
though simultaneously generating and tracking them. Th e thinking experience involves the 
most heightened and exhilarating feeling of being alive, says Hannah Arendt. She describes 
Heidegger’s ‘passionate thinking’12 as the idea of having ‘thought something’ rather than 
‘thought about something’. Th inking something, she said, requires that something be de-
sensed because the mind withdraws from the body to think.13 Th is is not quite the same as 
material thinking, that is, the ‘thinking with something’ that also involves the education of 
attention and the senses. 
Taking up a middle or common ground between ‘thinking something’ and ‘thinking 
about something’, the idea of ‘thinking with something’ can help draw attention to the 
qualitative and experiential diff erences that diff erent kinds of thinking involve, and under-
standing thinking as a relational endeavour. Th inking is always material whether one enga-
ges in writing philosophy, making an artwork, building a cabinet, studying the drosophila, 
or editing a fi lm. In his short essay, “What is the Creative Act”,14 Deleuze elaborates on the 
specifi city (rather than generality) of ideas and the consequent ways in which each is mani-
fested diff erently, depending on the expressive potential of their relevant diff erent subject 
matters. He says of the case of philosophy, “Treating philosophy as the power to ‘think 
about’ seems to be giving it a great deal, but in fact it takes everything away from it. No 
one needs philosophy to think […] If philosophy has to be used to think about something, 
it would have no reason to exist. If philosophy exists, it is because it has its own content”.15 
11 Hans Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 66.
12 Hannah Arendt. “Martin Heidegger at 80” in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. Murray, Michael (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978).
13 Hannah Arendt, Life of the Mind (London: Harcourt, 1971).
14 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006).
15 Deleuze, 2006, 313.
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Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, the specifi c task of philosophy is to create concepts. 
He continues,  
“No one has an idea in general. An idea – like the one who has the idea – is already dedicated 
to a particular fi eld. Sometimes it is an idea in painting, or an idea in a novel, or an idea in 
philosophy or an idea in science. [..] Ideas have to be treated like potentials, already engaged 
in one mode of expression or another and inseparable from the mode of expression, such 
that I cannot say that I have an idea in general.”16 
Th inking is material not because it needs something to think about, but because as a prac-
tice it is always already responsive to the diff erent expressive potentials of the matter at 
hand. Subject matters also have diff erent relational qualities that emerge in encounters 
of bodies, things, ideas and organisms, and through such encounters, diff erent forms of 
material thinking and diff erent kinds of ideas come to be worked through and manifested. 
If, as J.J. Gibson17 suggests, we need the education of attention in our studies, so too do 
we need an education of the senses, understood comprehensively, of the kind that would 
allow for a deep encounter with our subject matter. For example, when the fi lm director 
Andrei Tarkovsky18 said that life’s logic is poetic rather than scientifi c, he thought that the 
temporal nature of fi lm and the possibilities of editing that this medium permits might 
communicate poetically something of undergoing of the sensed and felt elements of expe-
riences: ‘documentary precision’ and ‘mechanical accuracy’, in his view, bring us no closer 
to reality. He elaborates on the careful process involved in making a fi lm, and the obstacles 
one faces: “[o]ften the director himself is so determined to be portentous that he loses 
all sense of measure and will ignore the true meaning of a human action, turning it into 
a vessel for the idea he wants to emphasise. But one has to observe life at fi rst hand, not 
to make do with the banalities of a hollow counterfeit constructed for the sake of acting 
and of screen expressiveness”.19 Properly speaking then, the technical is itself creative: one 
needs to think about the distance of the camera, the long fi xed shot, how one edits the 
temporalities of the piece, whether one allows the camera to linger on the face (Bergman), 
intersperse contemplative scenes of domestic interiors through the narrative (Ozu) or fi lm 
photographs with a voice over (Chris Marker). Sensitivity to the matter of fi lm and to fi lm’s 
potentials as a medium allows the director to develop his or her own individual style of 
expression, thought, temporality, materiality, and sensibility. Likewise, in the cases of forms 
of expression in poetry and literature – it makes a diff erence when a line runs into another 
stanza rather than retaining a sense of autonomy within a given verse, or one uses ellipses, 
16 Ibid, 312.
17 J.J. Gibson, Th e Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. (Sussex: Psychology Press, 1986).
18 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).
19 Tarkovsky, 25.
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or plays with syntax, as in the work of Beckett in Ill Seen, Ill Said.20 “From where she lies she 
sees Venus rise. On. From where she lies when the skies are clear she sees Venus rise fol-
lowed by the sun. Th en she rails at the source of all life. On.”21 Th e possibilities are many. 
Material practices and expressive manifestations diff er in accordance with one’s concern, 
sensibility and depth of understanding or imagination: space, the archive, fossils, the con-
versation, the remnant, code, the genome, or oral histories with living beings, the stories of 
non-monumental everyday life. 
Tim Ingold writes that “[..] it is a fallacy—and one that is found very frequently in 
archaeological writing— to suppose that objects are ever fi nished in this sense. For one 
thing, their forms are not imposed by the mind, but arise within the movement of the arti-
san’s engagement with the material; another, in the course of being used for one purpose, 
objects may undergo further modifi cation that make them peculiarly apt for another.”22 
He suggests that like humans, objects have histories, and that we ought to acknowledge 
rather better the ways in which relationships and practical engagement with one’s sur-
roundings are both formative and constitutive. Th e notion of a ‘blueprint’ model of design, 
by which an author or maker has an idea which then he or she realises, fails to comprehend 
the ways in which people wrestle with their subject matter and do not know how those 
engagements and tussles will end, unlike cases of generic skills talk where no resistance is 
off ered by the world. Ingold describes the way in which learning occurs as guided redisco-
very, showing, and the education of attention, noting that observation need not be that of 
the distanced spectator but “requires the observer to place himself or herself, in person, in 
a relation of active, perceptual engagement with the object of attention [..] Th ere can be no 
observation without participation, no explanation without interpretation, no science wit-
hout engagement.”23 Careful listening, responsiveness and attention to the (subject) matter 
before each of us invites new ways (for us) of perceiving, sensing, understanding and thin-
king, and confounds the hylomorphism implicit in some constructivist conceptions of edu-
cation. Becoming more concerned with the world and its stories, including one’s complex 
biography and perspective, is part of the practice of education and becoming educated, 
that is, loving the world. Like William Connolly24 and Jane Bennett,25 I am interested in a 
delicate, even irreverent, ethics of responsiveness and response-ability that is grounded in a 
relational ontology that invites curiosity and interest.
20 Samuel Beckett, Company/Ill Seen, Ill Said/Worstward Ho/Stirrings Still. (London: Faber and Faber, 2009).
21 Beckett, 51.
22 Ingold, 2001, 263-4.
23 Ibid, 276.
24 William Connolly, Th e Fragility of Th ings. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); William Connolly, A World of 
Becoming. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).
25 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: Th e Political Ecology of Th ings. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). https://doi.
org/10.1215/9780822391623; Jane Bennett, “Th e Force of Th ings: Steps Toward an Ecology of Matter”, Political 
Th eory 32, no.3 (2004): 347-372. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591703260853.
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Apprenticeships in Th inking
As Tim Ingold26 points out, “A skill like playing the cello, being a property of the organism 
established through practical experience in an environment, is every bit as ‘biological’ as 
walking on two feet”.27 Th e practical experience is vital here. Even if some aspects of skills 
are transferable, whatever this may mean, they begin and are cultivated in some form of 
practice. Conceptualising skills as a form of material thinking is to say that skills involve 
thinking with something, attending to it in its particularity. 
Of course, in the fi elds of epistemology and cognitive science where a good deal of 
criticism has been levelled at the idea that knowledge can and must be ‘abstract’, this is 
hardly unfamiliar territory. Francisco Varela argued that “proper units of knowledge are pri-
marily concrete, embodied, incorporated, lived” when he explained his enactive approach 
to cognition that emerges from practical engagement with the world.28 We might in turn 
think about other ways of understanding knowledge by re-imagining traditions of thinking. 
Refusing the split between the arts, humanities and human sciences, on the one side, and 
the natural sciences on the other, Tim Ingold states “[..] there can be no absolute division 
of method and objective between studying the lives and works of humans and of nonhu-
mans. Why, then, should the participatory and interpretative approaches of the arts and 
humanities be limited to the study of human subjects? And why, conversely, should the 
observational and explanatory approaches of science be limited to the domain of nonhu-
man “nature”? Why, indeed, should these approaches be separated at all?”.29
Philosophers like Gilbert Simondon30 and Jane Bennett have questioned the value and 
validity of hylomorphic approaches to thinking about matter by which (active) form shapes 
(passive) matter. Today in the wake of homo bureaucraticans, and in the context of the 
algorithmic condition, some of the images and discourses that accompany the concepts 
of ‘transferable’ or ‘generic’ skills’ seem to imply that skills can be not only uncoupled from 
material practices, but even developed without any subject matter, operating eff ectively 
regardless of context, or any content. Practices of thinking in diff erent fi elds involve acts 
of discovery and creation. Bennett prefers, she says, those encounters with creative mate-
riality that anyone who is intimate with things experiences. She includes in her list artisans, 
mechanics, cooks, builders and cleaners, though we could readily extend that list to the 
26 Tim Ingold, “Beyond biology and culture. Th e meaning of evolution in a relational world”. Social Anthropology 
12, 2004: 209-221. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0964028204000291; Ingold, T. (2011) Being Alive: Essays on Movement, 
Knowledge and Description. London: Routledge; Tim Ingold ‘From Complementarity to Obviation: On Dissolving 
the Boundaries between Social and Biological Anthropology, Archaeology, and Psychology’ in  Oyama, S., Griffi  ths, 
P.E., & Gray, R.D. (Eds.) Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 
255-280; Tim Ingold, Th e Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill.( London: Rout-
ledge, 2000).
27 Ingold, 2004, 216.
28 Francisco Varela, “Th e Reenchantment of the Concrete” in Incorporations, eds. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwin-
ter, (New York: Zone Books; 1992); Francisco Varela, Evan Th ompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991), Th e Embodied Mind. 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
29 Ingold, 2001, 274.
30 Gibert Simondon, L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique. (Grenbole: Éditions Jérôme Millon, 1995).
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‘things’ of the humanities and the sciences more broadly. Th e intimacy of the relation of 
metalworkers with their material allowed them to discover the ‘polycrystalline structure’ of 
non-organic matter. Th rough a tacit knowledge of their ‘protean activeness’, metals could 
be worked with and upon. Th is image of creative materiality can be extended beyond the 
examples off ered by Bennett in order to follow the inter-play of practitioners in any fi eld 
with the material with which they are in dialogue. One can witness skilfulness in the prac-
tice of the cytogeneticist, skilfulness that is embodied, embedded, emergent and contex-
tual, as described so well by Evelyn Fox Keller31 in her biography of Barbara McClintock. By 
seeing material practices of thinking in action, one grasps the immanent process through 
which each question or intervention opens up diff erent possibilities for understanding and 
action. Skills cannot exist in a realm that is divorced from the exercise and practice of spe-
cifi c, embedded and embodied activities. Oyama, Ingold, Grosz and Fox Keller invite us to 
begin to dismantle a nature/culture divide or a gene/organism divide that abstracts cer-
tain entities in order to give them causative power, as though they could exist beyond the 
material world with which they co-evolve. 
In Susan Oyama’s work in developmental biology, we can fi nd an analogous set of con-
cerns about ‘info-talk’ from those we encounter in those kinds of ‘skills-talk’ that promote 
generic context-independent and content-indiff erent skills, and that are indiff erent to both 
the knower and the known. When she32 describes her worries about the ‘de-substantialisa-
tion’ of her fi eld of knowledge – developmental biology, she takes issue fi rst and foremost 
with the way in which the language of genetics appears to be able to do without materia-
lity. Th e following quote illustrates this tendency, “Genetic information is said to be weight-
less and independent of its material substrate; for evolutionary biologist G.C. Williams it 
dwells in a “codical domain” separate from the physical one”.33 So too, Richard Dawkins34 
claimed that “life is just bytes and bytes and bytes of digital information”,35 “[...] a river of 
information, not a river of bones and tissues: a river of abstract instructions for building 
bodies, not a river of solid bodies themselves. Th e information passes through bodies and 
aff ects them, but it is not aff ected by them on its way through.”36 Th is is not meant to off er 
a metaphor for life, but is meant to be taken quite literally. Oyama calls this kind of talk 
‘info-talk’ whereby information’s power seems to stem from (a magical) abstract immate-
31 Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: Th e Life and Work of Barbara McClintock. (New York: Henry Holt, 
1984).
32 Susan Oyama, Evolution’s Eye: A System’s View of the Biology-Culture Divide. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2000a); Susan Oyama, Th e Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution. (2nd ed.). (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000b); Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffi  ths,, & Russell D. Gray. (Eds.), Cycles of Contingency: 
Developmental Systems and Evolution. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); Susan Oyama “Compromising Positions: Th e 
minding of matter” in Anouk Berberousse, Michel Morange & Th omas Pradeu (Eds.) Mapping the Future of Biology. 
(Netherlands: Springer, 2009). 
33 Oyama, 2009, 27.
34 Richard Dawkins, Th e Extended Phenotype: Th e Gene as the Unit of Selection. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982); Richard Dawkins, Th e Selfi sh Gene. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
35 Oyama, 2009, 36.
36 Ibid, 41.
49O’Donnell: Th e Matter of Th inking
riality. She argues that information is deifi ed in the work of people like Dawkins and Daniel 
Dennett,37 saying that, “Th e sprawlingly heterogeneous usage of information has only been 
touched on here, and part of my point is that the search for a one-size-fi ts-all organizational 
principle is misconceived”.38 She notes that “[r]hetorically making matter disappear also 
encourages neglect of the histories and concrete arrangements – time and space – that 
generate biological marvels, and makes it harder to communicate them eff ectively.”39
Oyama says, “Our cognitive and ethical responsibilities are based on our response-abi-
lity, our capacity to know and to do, our active involvement in knowledge and refl ection”.40 
Irresponsible approaches might include making ungrounded claims and statements, blithe 
indiff erence to evidence, or refusing to look at alternative arguments in a fi eld like philo-
sophy. It is not only those working in the sciences who must respond to and think with 
their subject matter. Th ose of us engaged in study, research and practice in the arts and 
humanities will be familiar with the experience of resistance and ambiguity of the material 
with which we are dealing. Much as we might like to make an argument or off er a parti-
cular interpretation, the material can be recalcitrant; it won’t be forced into a position it 
doesn’t ‘like’. We undertake careful processes of writing, reading, and of editing. We work 
to develop ideas, interpretations and arguments. We try to frame in a way that is generous 
and faithful to the subject matter. We try to ensure some kind of continuity or resonance 
between diff erent elements, even in forms of experimental writing or philosophy. We seek 
ways for heterogeneous elements to communicate in installation and fi lm. Th is is a matter 
of co-construction and interaction that also involves an ethical dimension. 
Isabelle Stengers,41 Susan Oyama and Elizabeth Grosz42 off er alternative visions that 
are born of diff erent ways of thinking about method and understanding in the sciences 
and the humanities and drawn from careful descriptions of practices. Rather than policing 
disciplinary boundaries, these thinkers are critical of dominant descriptions of the practice 
of research and thought in these domains. Th eir insights are particularly useful as we refl ect 
on what it is that we do in the humanities, the arts, and the sciences. Of value are sustained 
engagement, the cultivation of responsiveness, the capacity for judgement and the kind 
of creative attention that slowly emerges through deep, loving and intimate familiarity 
with a subject matter. Th e kind of skilfulness involved in these practices of ‘material thin-
king’ cannot be taught in abstraction from content nor is it readily transferable to other 
domains. Rather, the sustained interplay and dynamic relation with subject matter is part of 
an immanent process of thought that is attentive to and faithful to the matter of thought. 
37 Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
38 Oyama, 2009, 42.
39 Ibid, 43.
40 Ibid, 149.
41 Isabelle Stengers, Invention of Modern Science. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Isabelle Sten-
gers, Power and Invention: Situating Science. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
42 Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Refl ections on Life, Politics and Art. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011).
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When Oyama argues against reductionist conceptions of genes as sole causal factors or 
drivers of evolution in favour of a nuanced, context-driven constructivist model of evolu-
tion, she argues that this is more faithful to the complex and material development of living 
beings, whilst Grosz’s turn to Darwinian sexual selection allows her to frame the pursuit of 
understanding in the sciences and humanities in a language that is non-instrumental. Just 
as the bird cannot justify its song, it is absurd to ask humans to justify the many forms of 
expression and interest that are constitutive of homo sapiens as a linguistic, cultural, social, 
artistic, creative form of life, even if, as Nietzsche notes, man is an indeterminate animal. 
Although Oyama’s writings are concerned with information in the context of genetics 
and developmental biology, her thoughts are instructive for those of us concerned by the 
de-materialising turn in skills talk and its implications for education. “[I]nformation is not 
some mysterious stuff , capable of being transmitted from one place to another, translated, 
accumulated, and stored; rather it goes out of kinds of relations. For Gregory Bateson43 
information is a diff erence that makes a diff erence. Th is invites questions: a diff erence in 
what (what are you paying attention to?), about what (what matters?), for whom (who is 
asking, who is aff ected?). Asking these questions leads us to focus on the knower, a knower 
who always has a particular history, social location and point of view”.44 Oyama claims that 
scientifi c knowledge has been habitually disembodied and the use of the passive voice 
erases the context specifi city of the knower, including her cares, interests, perspectives, 
worries and power relations, such that we place no value on even the romance of discovery 
described by Whitehead.45 Th is also reveals the politics of knowledge; questions of method 
or legitimacy can become framed in such a manner so authoritative that no dissent is 
brooked, which then forecloses other ways of understanding and describing pathways to 
knowledge and understanding. She states her own position clearly. Speaking of biology, 
she asks that rather than seeking timeless truths, we might come to “appreciate particular 
perspectives as vehicles for empathy, investigation, and change [..]”.46
Material Th inking: Th e Matter of Th ought
It is not the case that the humanities have a somehow separate and special vocation from 
the sciences, even if they have had a tendency to make a tabula rasa of their forbearers, 
forgetting the human is also animal, a living organism, part of a long evolutionary lineage, 
co-emergent with multiple forms of life and matter, co-constituted by and with the tech-
nologies that change human capabilities, and inheritor of rich cultural traditions, beliefs 
and practices. So too have the natural sciences their own blindspots which is why Stengers 
43 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972); Gregory Bateson, Mind and 
Nature: A Necessary Unity. (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1979).
44 Oyama, 2000a, 147.
45 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. (New York: Th e Free Press, 1967).
46 Oyama, 2000a, 149.
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asks scientists to allow themselves to be “confronted with the manifold richness that they 
have for so long given themselves the right to forget. From now on, they will be faced with 
the problem that some have wanted to reserve for the human sciences – whether it be to 
elevate or to diminish them – the necessary dialogue with pre-existing knowledges concer-
ning situations familiar to everyone. No more than the sciences of society can the sciences 
of nature forget the social and historical roots that create the familiarity necessary for the 
theoretical modelising of a concrete situation.”47 Th is she describes as a poetic listening to 
nature, using ‘poetic’ in its etymological sense. Th is emphasis on the concrete situation is 
important; the form of engagement is determined by the concrete materiality of the situa-
tion so it is important to consider the kinds of reasons that are off ered for decisions made 
to bracket, suspend or ignore aspects of that situation, such as the weather, or the soil. 
Whatever subject matter we have come to love – and this is surely the hope of the edu-
cator that someone will not only come to learn something, but to love something – we will 
feel an affi  nity with the words of Shirley Strum when she says “to understand them I take 
the risk of loving them, that is of being transformed by them”. Strum speaks of her baboons 
in a way that is at odds with those conventional scientifi c discourses that emphasise the 
importance of neutrality, a particular form of objectivity, or that demand replicable met-
hodology. In this spirit of loving attention, Stengers notes how “McClintock tracked down 
the singularity of the genetic material of the corn she was studying, she defi ned it with 
precision and relentlessness [..]”48 She names her “intense jubilation”, her empathy, which 
enabled her to descend ‘into’ the cells she was examining”, allowing her to understand in 
“the most intimate sense of the term”.49 McClintock laughed when her corn surprised her: 
for her, corn was capable of reacting. 
Evelyn Fox Keller observes that “the research readily takes on the appearance of a con-
versation: the riposte has all the unexpectedness and charm that one fi nds in the response 
of an intelligent interlocutor.”50 Indeed, McClintock herself says, “If only we were content to 
let the material speak”.51 When we are open to listening to the material then we can learn 
through encounter, surprise, study, attention, and experience to ask the right questions. 
Stengers refl ects on this saying, “But from the moment she chose to no longer make use 
of corn but to learn ‘with’ it…”52 Th is is part of what education involves: the task of any 
practitioner is to come to learn with and think with the material, be it navigating archives, 
a body in a yoga posture, the feel of a grain of wood or the genesis of a philosophical con-
cept. As Stengers describes corn’s entangled histories, “its reproduction, its development, 
… its growth in the fi elds where it experiences the sun, the cold, predatory insects and so 
on”, she says quite fi rmly, “Indeed scientists should not accumulate ‘neutral’ observations 
47 Stengers, 2000, 46.
48 Fox Keller, 112.
49 Ibid, 115.
50 Ibid, 124.
51 Ibid, 126
52 Stengers, 1997, 129.
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about corn, but learn from it which questions to ask it, because like every historical being, 
corn is a singular being. And to say ‘corn’ is already to say too much … (ibid, 127). What 
is special, for her, about the science of evolution is that it precludes the power to judge a 
priori, as it discovers the need to put to work a more and more subtle practice of storytel-
ling. McClintock’s descriptions of her own practice of coming to learn about her corn helps 
us to gain insight into the practical eff orts of what it means to come to know something. 
Her stories communicate the vitality of a patient relation of ethical and creative attention 
that values the kind of understanding that can only emerge through sustained and careful 
observation. It is an exercise that shows what it means to come to love the world, and that 
values the world simply because it is, it exists.
Elizabeth Grosz also resists the invocation of instrumental language to justify the exi-
stence of the humanities though she also wonders what intellectual revolution would need 
to occur such that they might be re-imagined “to make man, and the various forms of man, 
one among many living things, and one force among many, rather than the aim and desti-
nation of all knowledges [..]”.53 In seeking out the ‘inhuman’ in the humanities, and the affi  -
nities between humans and other sentient beings (and for Bennett this also would include 
inorganic matter like chemical compounds to basalt or tin cans), she refuses to justify their 
existence by appealing to their utility, however worthy, in cultivating character, citizenship 
or competence. Th e expressiveness of diverse forms of life, as described in the writings of 
Darwin, leads her to ask: What if the borderline between the humanities and sciences were 
to become less secure, more open, more interactive without being reductionist on either 
side? 
What if we were to become better attuned to the eroticism of language, the sensuality 
it invites, be it in birdsong or poetry, and the pleasures it creates? Darwin’s writings on 
sexual selection show how he clearly distinguished sexual selection from natural selection. 
Tool-making, seduction, language, decoration, love, curiosity, and pleasure are not speci-
fi c to the human species, and if we allow ourselves to refl ect on these areas of common 
endeavour and experience, we might come to dismantle the abyss of separation between 
the human and the animal. Engagement in these activities is part of what it is to be a living 
human being, just as the bird sings or the beaver builds a dam. To attend properly to the 
stories of all beings, animate and inanimate, requires an apprenticeship in material thinking.
In Conversation with Matter
In both the sciences and the humanities, we develop skilfulness through engagement and 
conversation with our subject matter. Th inking with something undoes the notion that 
thinking only takes place in the Cartesian, or even computational, mind. Material thin-
king demands a dialogical, rigorous and sensitive disposition and a skilfulness that needs 
53 Grosz, 13.
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something ‘other’ than itself. Th e language of probing, enquiry and investigation seems, 
sometimes, to rather better communicate this. Richard Sennett’s comments in Th e Craf-
tsman54 are useful in this respect. Although he focuses on the making of concrete things, 
his insights are also important for those domains such as the humanities that are some-
times wrongly construed as ‘immaterial’, as only ‘theory’. Th ese disciplines and fi elds also 
involve a relation to the world and are usually manifested in material forms such as texts, 
archives, fi lm or voice. He asks “[w]hat the process of making concrete things reveals to us 
about ourselves’, adding ‘[l]earning from things requires us to care about the qualities of 
cloth or the right way to poach fi sh [..]”.55 Sennett’s sense of what it is to do something well 
involves a fi delity to the ‘thing itself’ and requires “skill, commitment and judgement”.56 If 
“every good craftsman conducts a dialogue between concrete practices and thinking”,57 as 
Sennett argues, it might help to begin to re-conceive the practice of subjects in the huma-
nities and sciences in terms of the material knowing and thinking of craftsmanship, not in 
terms of a pre-conceived end product, but rather by attending to the sensitive manner in 
which a craftsman works with his or her material. Sennett makes the following arguments 
in respect of his understanding of skills. “[F]irst all skills, even the most abstract, begin as 
bodily practices; second; that technical understanding develops through the powers of the 
imagination”.58 Th e process of learning involves learning from the resistance and ambiguity 
of the given material, and the facility to improvise develops over time. He argues against 
any simplifi cation and rationalisation of skills, such as a teacher’s manual; because we are 
complex organisms, manuals simply cannot capture the elements and relations at play. 
What if we were to tell the stories of the matter of our subjects and why they matter, as 
teachers, students, and researchers, detailing the subtle practices of storytelling that they 
demand? We could communicate practices of thinking responsive and in dialogue with 
their material, the need for deep attention in study in these areas, and the tension of this 
with the direction of contemporary life and its world-alienation. We might tell of our reser-
vations about the meaningfulness and relevance of much of the a priori skills language 
that abounds, our refusal to subordinate educational aims to the short-term objectives 
of business, and resist servicing dominant discourses by re-framing our research within an 
instrumental rationale. We could refuse to apologise, and ask how we might retrieve a 
sense of our world and the natural history of humankind, a history far richer than the cari-
cature of homo economicus. We could ask what possibilities are off ered to a human life to 
explore the world, becoming attuned to the human as a being in becoming, a human who 
is natural, historical, cultural, linguistic, expressive, desiring, creative and sensual. When we 
witness the expressiveness and lack of utility of so much of nature, why do we feel compel-
54 Richard Sennett, Th e Craftsman. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
55 Sennett, 8.
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led to impoverish our understanding of human existence, and tie it to key performance 
indicators? Why do we feel we need to justify life? Cultivating skilfulness in material thin-
king returns us to the rich materiality of the world and to practices of education that allows 
us to singularise each of our existences with all the exuberant superfl uity of life, and come 
to both conserve and love the world. 
